What Happened? Here’s what…

The All Blacks are the best team in the world. Not the best rugby team in the world, the best TEAM in the world, across any sport, through the passage of time. They are in hallowed company along with Phil Jackson’s Bulls, Ferguson’s United and Steve Waugh’s Australians. That’s just the recent company, not taking cognisance of Pele’s Brazil. So when they lose, the whole world gets to know.

The English victory at Yokohama last weekend was so facile, that many here-for-the-selfie’s fans, who had followed Nirvana’s “here we are now, entertain us” mantra, were a little disappointed by the All Blacks disappearing act. Even the more educated fans who follow the All Blacks but not so much world rugby, were understandably scratching their heads.

The victory by Eddie Jones’ England team, for those who saw it coming, was all but inevitable. Here’s why:

1. The All Blacks have constantly spoken of ‘worrying about ourselves’. But before this match they broke from that discipline and played a horse for a course, i.e. – Scott Barrett at no. 6. This is a phrase Eddie Jones uses constantly “horses for courses”, and Hansen, who prides himself on focusing inwards, pulled one out of his rival’s playbook.
2. Three times before, the All Blacks have suffered as a result of positional shifts. In 1999, 2003 and 2007 they moved full backs to centre and suffered defeats without making the final. This time it’s not the no. 13 position but the back row shuffling that caused the problem. Positional changes with an important game on the line, is reckless and hints of a little desperation, which in turn exposes the lack of confidence in preparation.
3. Why do it, then? The answer is simple. It was a message to Eddie. The All Blacks team naming was around noon on Thursday, with England naming their team at 5pm. It gives the team going second an unfair advantage, but it also allows the team going first to throw a wild card in there. Which is exactly what Hansen tried to do.
4. England’s game plan against NZ, was always going to be obvious. They were going to pin New Zealand in their territory either by kicking to touch, or by kicking to the corners. There were always going to be lineouts. Eventually, there were 31.
5. Hansen was telling Eddie that if they adopted this game plan, New Zealand with their four high quality jumpers Retallick, Whitelock, Read and Barrett, would outnumber and steal England’s ball while not surrendering any of their own. It was a credible plan. However, New Zealand failed to execute.
6. In the end England threw into 20 line outs and New Zealand 11. That’s nearly twice as many for the victors over the vanquished. Given that New Zealand kicked from open play only 28 times, it looks like they have kicked pretty much all their ball out, and given that they’ve had only 38% territory, all out in their own half. That meant that New Zealand absolutely had to steal England’s line out ball. They stole one of 20 while George overthrew one that led to the easiest try Savea has scored in his explosive career. If the Barrett move was to work, they needed to attack the English line out, which functioned, on the day, like a symphony orchestra.
8. If a man of the match award was ever deserved by a coach, Steve Borthwick deserves it for implementing Eddie Jones’ unflinching ‘stick to the script’ instructions. Itoje was masterful and Lawes was disciplined as they stole nearly 20% of New Zealand’s ball, and won plenty of their own ball. As a result, the All Blacks found themselves unable to kick, run, or backflip their way out of their 40m mark. And this All Black team, not for the first time in the last couple of years, showed an inability to deal with frustration.
10. After the first group game victory against South Africa I asked Dane Coles why Sam Whitelock hadn’t taken a single line out in that game. He said I “should ask Reado”, implying that Read calls the lineouts. If that was indeed the case, one moment stood out in the first half. With the game still at 7-0 Read, who was opposed by Itoje, and had the luxury of Whitelock, Retallick and Barrett – only one who would be marked by a genuine jumper – to call on, chose to call the lineout directly to himself. It may have been one poor decision, but it exposed the lack of clear thinking under pressure. The team had been picked exactly to win the line out, and here was the captain calling the low percentage ball. No wonder, Steve Hansen looked annoyed.
12. In the end, Richie Mo’unga was deprived of any real running options with Anton Lienert-Brown unable to impose himself on the game. Barrett, who had been picking defences apart since 2015, was relegated to patrolling the goal line and scurrying the ball into touch. A job he rarely does, while a man who has made a lifetime of it watched from the stands. In the end, perhaps the experience of Ryan Crotty could have helped Mo’unga, his franchise team-mate. In the end, perhaps the presence of Ben Smith in the back three would have eased the defensive duties for Barrett and shared the decision making duties. The inexperienced back three were exposed, chasing back often and not having answers.
14. It’s easy to say in hindsight, but Crotty’s and Smith’s absences were felt more than anyone would imagine. And some of us did say this before the fact. You can’t buy experience.
15. Barrett’s inclusion was not the problem. Cane’s exclusion was. By including Barrett, the third row lost its balance. Kieran Read has regressed into half the player he was, and offers the same as, or maybe even less than Barrett does across the park. His relegation from no. 8 in the attacking scrums must hurt, even though the coaches and players try h
16. hard to downplay Savea’s constant shifting from side to back to side.
18. The third row lost its mobility with the two bigger, slower, players in the back row, and Savea lost his edge, being forced into a more conventional fetching role which Cane revels in.
20. Same Cane is not only similar to a young McCaw in looks, but also his callous disregard for his own body. If New Zealand were to offer Mo’unga and Barrett some room to move, they needed him shifting bodies at ruck time.  It’s a task all three loosies for New Zealand can do, but do a second slower than Cane does.
22. In the final equation, a second was all Curry and Underhill needed to latch on and make life difficult. When Cane came on, New Zealand looked better in the second half, but it was too little too late after the first half was played virtually with one man less.
24. At the back of his mind, Read knows that he holds his place purely as captain. His performances and core skills have been abysmal. So much so that Hansen has taken every chance to prop up his captain at press conferences whenever he has been as little as competent. This is something that players know, but given how tight this All Black group is, not something that is talked about. However, it is something that simmers, and players often don’t look upto a captain that is being selected on reputation. This is conjecture on my part, but it’s a working hypothesis, which may explain why players’ heads never raised themselves after the England’s initial salvo had found their mark.
26. The non-exclusion of Read, and the exclusion of Smith and Crotty are errors in judgment. Errors that should have been avoided if enough debate was had, and the media’s suggestions were met with less derision and condescension. Too much consultation can lead to bad decisions, as can too little. It’s a fine balance.
28. At the start of the tournament I watched New Zealand score off two South African knock ons. I asked if he was worried that New Zealand wasn’t “creating enough”. Hansen didn’t seem too worried, and the Ireland victory probably vindicated him temporarily. He did worry about TQB, and said “you can’t strike” unless you have it. Against England they scored one try, off the back of an overthrown line out. They created zero. And it is a desperately relevant problem for the All Blacks who threw all their eggs in the possession basket.
30. This All Blacks team is a work-in-progress. The next coach has plenty to do.