Though Sri Lanka is supposed to be accursed with Kweni’s curse, this Island resplendent with natural resources and fair weather is a far cry from being cursed. Yet, in our long history, we have almost never had a dull day due to aggressions and invasions from foreign forces. Still, it is a case of worms infesting the lushest fruit in the orchard than due to a curse. We have however been cursed with Kweni-like characters, who for absolutely shortsighted and selfish reasons had a penchant for betraying the country. From Ravan’s time right down to the 2015 co-signing of the UNHRC resolution AGAINST Sri Lanka, we have been regularly punched in the middle by our own leaders.

Given that fact, and the fact that we always had to fight off mightier forces, sometimes in combination, it is truly amazing that we are still standing. Of course, history extolls the great leaders who eventually came to give the political and military will and leadership to defeat the enemy and unite the country once more. What history unwittingly neglects to credit is the character of the people, who bore the brunt of the enemy and still kept our identity until such a leader surfaced. This is especially evident in the post-independent era.

Since regaining our independence, we have been struggling to find our footing. Less than 70 years and we are already on our third constitution, and a forth is in the making. This is a result of our confusing times.

Within the first 11 years, we had four prime ministers. It was sheer bad luck that our first PM Mr. DS Senanayake, fell to his death from his horse. His son, Dudley, who proceeded him resigned within one and a half years following the mishandling of a protest over the price of rice. Within three years, Sir John Kotelawala as the third PM was defeated by SWRD Bandaranaike, who was assassinated three years later. Wijeyananda Dahanayake took over the reigns only to be forced to dissolve the parliament within six months due to disharmony within his own party. Though Dudley returns, his government was defeated after just one month. SWRD’s widow, Sirima then becomes the next PM as the world’s first woman PM.

She managed to hold on to office for five years. Within two years of coming to office though, the country had a near military coup. It was only thwarted because of the timely action of one honorable police officer, SP Stanley Senanayake, who went on to become the IGP (Lessons from the Past, August 15, 2016). Her successor, Dudley too had a similar near miss. While Sirima’s experience made her extremely suspicious of the military, Dudley understood the need for a special branch in the police charged with national security.

When Sirima once again assumed office in five years time, she disbanded this special branch despite compelling evidence of an impending insurrection (Failed Lessons from 1971, August 22, 2016). Even after the Janatha Vimukthi Permuna insurrection exploded on her face, leaving many dead, the need for a robust intelligence system was not understood. Despite the almost simultaneous surfacing of terrorism in the north that was openly instigated by the Tamil politicians and supported by Tamil Nadu, the then government was more interested in introducing a new constitution than on national security.

During her tenure, Sirima lost a strong pillar in the northern theater when Alfred Duruaiappah was gunned down. It was however dismissed as an act of a fellow rival (Tracing the Origins of Terrorism, November 21, 2016). Despite the bank robberies, small explosions and the systematic assassination of Tamil police officers in the North, facts on board were not taken for closer examination.

Though the government failed to understand the need for a robust intelligence system, the terrorists did not take a chance. Hence Tamil police officers in the North were systematically eliminated for they spoke the language, understood the temperament of the people and the terrain of the land.

After seven years in office, Sirima was defeated. JR Jayewardena, as the next PM became Sri Lanka’s first Executive President. He knew that India was playing a pivotal role in funding, training and arming these terrorist groups. He thus ought to have first strengthened the Sri Lanka Navy and the Military Intelligence (MI). The Navy would have created an effective blockade to curtail the smuggling of arms and terrorists into the country. The MI would have tracked and infiltrated these groups and been in a position to maneuver them to our agenda.

Instead, JR tried to play chess with international relations. Unfortunately, as he failed to strengthened our side first through the Navy and MI, it was he who got outmaneuvered by the Indians. Despite the military victory against terrorism within reach, he was forced to sign the thirteenth amendment that is inimical to our sovereignty and watch helplessly as the Indian Peace Keeping Force stationed themselves in the North and the East, whilst confining our own forces into barracks. Perhaps the only good that came out of that episode was that India stepped out of shadows to reveal itself as the mastermind behind the terrorists.

Ranasinghe Premadasa was the first leader since Independence to truly understand the value of clandestine operations and using enemy against enemy. As a small country, Sri Lanka could not directly take on the IPKF, which would amount to declaring war with India. Thus, he used the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the only terrorist outfit poised to defy the IPKF, to attack the Indians. The mistake Premadasa did was to mistake enemy’s enemy as friend. Again, that was due to his failure to strengthen our MI, and have the LTTE infiltrated.

Had he done that, he would have understood that the LTTE had acquired military capability, especially in terms of strategy that was alien to the IPKF. He would have also understood that the IPKF became the common enemy of both the Sri Lankan Government (SLG) and the LTTE for very different reasons. For the SLG, the IPKF was a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity; for the LTTE, the IPKF was a betrayal by the Indian Government to carve out their own exclusive country.

Thus, when the LTTE after getting rid of one enemy, turned to attack its second enemy, the SLG found itself at a total disadvantage. For one thing, the LTTE had got its military and infrastructure strengthened largely thanks to the generosity of the SLG. It had also developed a formidable reputation that convinced many advisors in the West that the LTTE could never be militarily defeated. After all, it was at the hands of the LTTE that the IPKF suffered so humiliatingly.

This image, more than its actual military capability served the LTTE well. It gave them the license to break successive cease fire agreements, notably the infamous 2002 CFA, with impunity. Yet, the West-led international community put immense pressure on the SLG to continue negotiating with the terrorists irrespective of the provocations.

The LTTE after using the respite the cease fire periods gives to strengthen and regroup, would again launch full scale military offensives and continue until they are too weak to continue. The fact that it was the only reason the LTTE ever agreed to come to the negotiating table and never because of any hold the West had or a genuine need to explore an alternative solution, was lost on all players. Such was the power of the image they had got from the IPKF episode.

Throughout all this, MI was regarded more as an information gatherer than a processor of intelligence. As such, not much credibility was attached to the force. Within the military, they were derided as the news readers and ridiculed for getting their information from the media. Major General Kamal Gunaratne describes it best when he recalls that the MI then would predict at least 25 places that might be attacked and their relief if at least one of those predictions proved true.

Once the Rajapaksa administration in 2005-6 became resolute to militarily defeat the terrorists without further endless and pointless negotiations, two factors became decisive in achieving this end. One was the strengthening of the forces. This allowed the Sri Lankan military to attack on multiple fronts and hold on to the land cleared. The other was giving the MI a freehand to think creatively and operate constructively.

The role the MI played especially since the clearing of the East was pivotal. Military defeat of a terrorist organization only destroys its fighting component, but not its ideology, network or its repository of hidden arm caches. To root out terrorism, this entire complex needs to be uprooted and destroyed. Otherwise, it is just a threat going into sleep mode, waiting for the right moment to wake up.

The Rajapaksa administration had carefully studied past experiences before embarking on their quest to eradicate terrorism. Thus, they knew that Abu Ghraib style treatment was futile and counter productive, creating more sympathy and thereby support for terrorists than diminish it. Thus, they designed a daring double game that effectively exposed the entire terrorist complex that spanned well beyond the shores of Sri Lanka.

Since 2007, they began to target the intelligence wing of the LTTE. Starting with a force less than 1500, the MI began to infiltrate the LTTE. Their task been gathering information and processing intelligence, they needed a live network to feed them the correct information. Though today they are branded as contract killers, the reality was the MI could not afford to lose the targets they picked.

Before picking up a target, they went to extraordinary lengths to know every detail of that target. For instance, when they picked up Ram, they not only knew he was almost as senior as Prabakaran, with about 25 years of experience, operating as an Eastern commander, but also that during the course of the 30-year terrorism, he had lost his children and wife. Their infiltration was so superb that he literally got into an MI vehicle with his passport with the intention of going abroad. Until he was settled in the vehicle he did not realize that he had been apprehended.

The Sinhalese, the LTTE cadres had been convinced, to be barbarians. If caught, they would be tortured to death was what was taught to them. Hence the cyanide capsule. Instead, they were taken to undisclosed locations and treated very well. Zero publicity was given to their apprehensions. Thus, none knew they were in the MI custody.

Instead of interrogations, the MI had long discussions with the apprehended terrorists, where they were encouraged to examine the feasibility of their fight. Talking late into nights, over meals, they realized the enormity of their loss in terms of family, years and opportunity without any gains to justify it. Once they realized that they will not be killed, and that the Sinhalese are not the barbarians they were convinced to believe, they desired to live and live in peace.

As the LTTE top ranked intelligence got thus convinced, they with the MI formed a pseudo LTTE network. They called their contacts, allowing MI to monitor the conversations. This enabled the MI to identify the terrorists who were going into hiding as they suffered defeat after defeat. Convincing them to regroup, the MI lured them to false cells and gathered vital information such as identifying the local and international networks, locations caches of ammunition and weapons were hidden and the channels that were funding them.

Without firing a single shot, or resorting to any barbaric acts of torture, the MI played its cards superbly and cut off the bloodline to the LTTE fighting cadre. Their dedication was not only instrumental in defeating the LTTE, but also in preventing any resurrection. It took 30 years for political leadership to align with equally resolute military leadership. Their success however came through because of the inherent character of the ordinary man, who despite limited resources, took the whole world on for country and nation.