The Mechanics of Chasing: Why We Are Shit At It

Chasing in a ODI game is tough. But on the plus side, unlike the side batting first, there’s the advantage of knowing exactly how much you need to get. This is a sword which has the double edge of ‘scoreboard pressure’ as well as ‘certainty of target’.

The Uncertain Target Syndrome, when batting first, is what dictates the innings’ velocity. And for a team like Sri Lanka who only have 3 players who can dictate the pace of the innings, this becomes rather difficult. Normally, a pitch begins to show its true colours after the first few overs once the ball has softened slightly. So even if the openers haven’t gone hard, you can more or less compensate if you think the pitch is a belter. Then the lower order batsmen adopt a Get As Much As We Can approach and go for broke. And it’s great if you’ve got the personnel to pull it off. Like India, or Australia, or South Africa, or West Indies, or New Zealand or…wait, that’s quite a few of them. If you don’t, as Jayawardena often doesn’t, you’re never sure whether you take risks accelerating or you take a few less risks and ensure you bat out the 50 overs.

This is not the case in chasing. Your target is finite, you have an understanding of how the pitch is playing, and which bowlers maybe effective on that particular deck, and you can strategise in the break. At least, in theory you can.

Everything, in life and cricket. Needs to be. Broken down.

For example, Sri Lanka were chasing 360 on a small ground in good batting conditions today in Dunedin. They had to give themselves the best chance of achieving the target. Whether they achieve it or not, is not what I will judge them on. What I will judge them on is whether as a batting side, they gave themselves the best chance of doing, regardless of if they perished in the cause.

360 off 300 is 7.20 an over for 50 overs. That sounds tough, and is enough to demoralise anybody. 360 off 300 sounds a little bit better. More achievable.

What this means is that your entire team has to score at well over a run a ball. This means the entire batting line up has to have strike rates of over 100. Not right through their innings, but at least at the point of getting out. 1.2 runs a ball to be exact. Or 120 off each 100. Granted, that some batsmen who get out for low scores will not have that. But the side note to that is that they also haven’t faced too many balls, which are the run scoring resources.

So a batsman who makes 7 off 10 or even 12, with a strike rate of 70 or even 50, can be forgiven. Sort of. But someone who scores 10 off 20 commits an unforgivable sin, because he’s faced in excess of 3 overs (7%) of available resources and given you less than 3 % of the runs.

Now while some people may think that every ball is the same, all you men reading this will know, with a simple nod towards yours or your friends’ crotch, that no two balls are the same. Or have the same value. Therefore, the 1st Power Play in the 1st ten overs, and the additional 5 over power play together with the last ten overs, have a premium on them. If you remember that every batsman has to have a close of business strike rate of 120, then the blokes batting in the premium overs, ideally need to give a solid platform to those facing the ‘normal’ overs.

So at the end of the 1st Powerplay, Sri Lanka’s par score would have been 72. Instead, they were 51 runs at the end of 10. A full 20 runs short of the asking rate.

Now, I would buy the argument of ‘keeping wickets till the end’ but I think this SL team needs to take a long hard look in the mirror and realise it does not have the kind of firepower to propel an innings at the death like Luke Ronchi (170 off 99) did for New Zealand. Now the good thing about chasing is that with an accurate assessment of your strengths and weaknesses, you should, perchance, have known that Sri Lanka were never going to get a 110 runs in the last 8 overs. We’re just not that kind of team. Which is why, the par 72 off the first 10 overs, was never going to be enough. That being said, the 51 that we actually got was not even in the ball park. Sri Lanka should ideally have been aiming to go for about 90 runs in the first ten. At international level, with the field up, this should be possible in a chase of this magnitude even for the loss of one wicket. However, Sri Lanka were never setting themselves up for that sort of target in the first ten. Granted, Southee and Boult were bowling, but unless you plan to go for 20 an over off the other bowlers, you are going to get stuck in the quicksand. Might as well give yourself the best chance. We didn’t, and still lose by over a hundred runs. So what harm in trying optimally, and still losing by a hundred runs?

Now you may remember, that the asking strike rate was 120 from each batsman. It seems harsh but even TMD’s superb innings of 116 finished at a strike rate of 103. So was it really that super from a teams point of view? Did it get the job done? No. Jayawardena and Mendis were the only other batsmen to go at over a run a ball, but they made 48 runs between them off 46 balls. Nowhere near good enough.

If Dilshan is going to bat the long innings at 103 strike rate, then someone has to go big. Someone has to bat close to a 150 strike rate and scores about 50 or 60 runs. Do we have anyone who’s able to do that? Angelo on the odd day perhaps? But not regularly.

So that is why Captain for the Day, Thirimmanne’s knock was abysmally, destructively bad. He faces nearly 11 overs (more than 20% of available resources), for 12.5% of the team’s runs. This is worse, because he’s batting in the PP which we need to capitalise on. So instead of scoring what is required, he should ideally be scoring more than what is required. Instead he is scoring WELL less than what is required.

Sangakkara, realising this, played and missed at more than I’ve ever seen him play and miss. NZ happily gave him 9 singles and the poor lad was stifled for 17 balls. Eventually, he frustratedly holed out, knowing that him remaining in the middle was not going to serve any purpose. At least he was able to realise that which Thirimanne didn’t.

For argument’s sake, imagine that the openers were asked to see out the first ten. Don’t lose wickets to the new ball pair. Fair enough. But if that’s the case, the balance 40 have to be HUGE. And we do NOT – I repeat – have that game. Also, if one of the openers were asked to play the anchor role so the others could bat round him, then we don’t really know who that was. Because one or the other needed to really smash it if the other one was batting at less than required.

By the time Jayawardena came in in the 27th over with the run rate almost at ten, he took undue risks. And perished. Can’t blame him. While Chandimal and Perera didn’t trouble the scorers, the game was well lose by that time and there was no way they could have rescued it. So this game, was actually lost by the 20th over, when Sri Lanka were so far behind they didn’t give the existing personnel a chance. Dimuth Karunaratne, the first choice opening batsman, batted at 9. It’s a bloody joke. A cruel, unfunny joke.

Tactically and strategically, we lost this match before a ball was bowled. Unless something changes dramatically, we may not advance beyond the first round.